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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the cost of business cycles under market incompleteness. Pri-
marily, we focus on the heterogeneity in the cost among di®erent skill groups. Unskilled
workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are
skilled workers. Moreover, unskilled workers earn less income, which limits their ability
to self-insure. We examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk and income
translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles. We ¯nd that the welfare cost
of business cycles for unskilled workers is substantially higher than the welfare cost for
skilled workers.
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11 Introduction
In everyday discussions of economic policy, it is usually assumed that business cycles are
harmful and that it is bene¯cial to eliminate them. Many would agree that stabilization is
bene¯cial if it comes without cost. However, stabilization policies are often very costly, and
it is not obvious whether we should avoid business cycles when the cost of doing so is large.
What, in fact, is the cost of having business cycles? How much resource cost can be justi¯ed
to eliminate business cycles? In an in°uential study, Lucas (1987) considered these questions.
His result was astounding|the cost of having business cycles is almost zero.1
Lucas's use of a representative agent and an aggregate consumption series are justi¯ed in
an environment where complete Arrow-Debreu markets exist. Under complete asset markets
and a common constant relative risk aversion utility function, the aggregation theorem holds
and the consumption series of each individual will parallel the aggregate consumption series.
In reality, however, it is unlikely that asset markets are complete.2
Under incomplete markets, the costs of business cycles may be larger than the cost in the
representative-agent framework, since individuals have only a limited set of devices to insure
themselves from the shocks.3 More importantly, since individual consumption paths do not
parallel the aggregate consumption path, it is possible that the cost of business cycles di®er
across individuals.
In recent papers, Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) pointed out that the cost of business
cycles may di®er among di®erent groups of people. For example, agents with larger asset
holdings would have a greater opportunity to self-insure against unemployment risk. It is
expected that very poor agents would have a larger cost of business cycles. Krusell and Smith
(1999, 2002) reported that there is considerable heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles
1He ¯nds that the welfare cost is 0:008% of the steady-state consumption when the representative agent
has logarithmic utility.
2See Obstfeld (1994) and Barlevy (2004) for other critiques of Lucas's approach.
3See _ Imrohoro¸ glu (1989), Atkeson and Phelan (1994), and Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) for this point.


































Figure 1: Unemployment Rates by Skill.
Data Source: Current Population Survey
among agents with di®erent wealth.
The analysis by Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) abstracts from an important source of
heterogeneity|di®erence in skills. Figure 1 is drawn using annual data from the Current
Population Survey (1970{2001). It illustrates the unemployment processes for unskilled work-
ers (high school diploma or lower) and for skilled workers (some college or above). The two
processes di®er dramatically. Unskilled workers are not only subject to a higher level of un-
employment, but also face a more volatile unemployment process. This implies that unskilled
workers are hurt more by recessions.4 Moreover, unskilled workers earn less income, which
limits their ability to self-insure. We examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk
and income translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles.
To this end, we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. In
the model, there is heterogeneity in skills, employment status, and the discount factor. In
4Mincer (1991) documented that unskilled workers are subject to a substantially larger risk of becoming
unemployed in recessions than are skilled workers. Topel (1993) shows that the unemployment rate of low-wage
men is not only higher, but also much more volatile.
3addition, the heterogeneity in asset holding is endogenously generated. The heterogeneity in
skills are represented by the di®erences in earnings and the unemployment process.
We ¯nd that the welfare cost of business cycles for unskilled individuals, who su®er from
unemployment more frequently and are more likely to have binding borrowing constraints,
is substantially higher than the cost for the representative agent in complete-market models
or the average cost in incomplete-market models.
On average, our quantitative results are comparable to the previous results obtained by
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). However, the average num-
ber masks a substantial heterogeneity in the model. In our ¯rst experiment, which assumes
that the °uctuations are eliminated during a boom, the gain from eliminating business cycles
is 0.043% (of steady-state consumption) for unskilled workers, while skilled workers gain only
0.005%. In the second experiment, which assumes that °uctuations are eliminated during
a recession, unskilled workers gain 0.119%,5 while skilled workers gain 0.043%. Further,
a borrowing-constrained, unskilled, and unemployed agent can gain 0.622% from eliminat-
ing business cycles, which is nearly eighty times larger than the number found using the
representative-agent framework.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our baseline model. In
Section 3 we analyze the welfare e®ects of removing business cycles. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes the environment and solves the model economy.
5Note that this ¯gure is larger than any of the average gains obtained in Krusell and Smith's (2002)
experiments, which assumes longer unemployment durations than in our calibration. When we calibrate our
model with similar unemployment processes as Krusell and Smith (2002), the gains for unskilled workers in
both experiments are larger than Krusell and Smith's (2002) average gains. See Appendix E for details.
42.1 Setup
Our model is a standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type dynamic general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets (Aiyagari [1994]). In particular, we build upon the model with
aggregate shocks developed by Krusell and Smith (1998).













where ct is the consumption in period t and ¯0 = 1. We allow the discount factor ¯t to di®er
across agents and to vary over time. In particular, ¯t is assumed to be stochastic and follow
a Markov process. At each point in time, some agents are more patient than others. We
interpret each agent as an altruistic dynasty. Each agent's patience level may di®er across
generations. This formulation serves as a device to produce a realistic wealth distribution.6
There are two types of agents: skilled (´ = s) and unskilled (´ = u). Each agent's
skill status, ´, may change over time by a stochastic process that is uncorrelated across
agents, but the number of skilled (Âs) and unskilled (Âu) workers is constant, by the law
of large numbers. A skilled worker can supply more labor than an unskilled worker. We
express this dependence by the function Á(´), where Á(s) > Á(u). The value Á(s)=Á(u) can
be interpreted as the skill premium. We assume that Á(´) is constant over time. The skill
premium is, therefore, acyclical.7
An agent is either employed (² = 1) or unemployed (² = 0). The employment status is
determined by an exogenous random process. When employed, the agent supplies Á(´) units
of labor to the market. When unemployed, she engages in household production. Household
production utilizes the same technology as the market technology,8 but the agent can supply
6This method was developed by Krusell and Smith (1998).
7This assumption is motivated by the empirical studies by Keane and Prasad (1993) and Lindquist (2004).
8It is implicitly assumed that a worker can rent capital for household production without limit. This
assumption is not inconsistent with the household borrowing constraint, introduced below, if the household
5only a fraction h < 1 of her market labor supply. Thus, she is less e±cient at home than in
the market.9 The probability of becoming unemployed di®ers between skilled and unskilled
agents. The unemployment probability also depends on the aggregate state of the economy.
The market technology is represented by the aggregate production function
Y = z¹ k®¹ n1¡®;
where ¹ k is the aggregate capital and ¹ n is the aggregate labor, including the labor supplied
for household production. The economy is subject to aggregate shocks. The aggregate state
is either good or bad. In a good state, z = g and the unemployment rate for skill level ´ is
¹
g
´. In a bad state, z = b and the unemployment rate for skill level ´ is ¹b
´. We assume that
g > b and ¹
g
´ < ¹b
´ for ´ = s;u; i.e., productivity is higher and the unemployment rate is
lower in booms than in recessions.
We assume that there are no insurance markets for the idiosyncratic shocks. Agents can
hold only one kind of asset { capital. Holding a negative amount of capital (borrowing) is
allowed up to an exogenous limit k.











where J is the set of agents and kj is the capital holding of an agent j. The markets are
competitive, so the interest rate r and the wage w are determined by their marginal products.
Each household's period-by-period budget constraint is
c + k0 = rk + wÁ(´)µ(²) + (1 ¡ ±)k;
production capital can be perfectly collateralized.
9This assumption is made so that an agent can earn some labor income even when she is unemployed.
Alternatively, we can introduce an unemployment insurance system µ a la Hansen and _ Imrohoro¸ glu (1992). In




h if ² = 0;
1 if ² = 1;
k0 is the next period's capital, and ± is the depreciation rate of capital.
2.2 Probability Structure
There are two types of exogenous shocks: aggregate and idiosyncratic. The aggregate state
evolves stochastically following a Markov process. The probability of moving from state z to
state z0 is denoted as pzz0.
There are three idiosyncratic shocks: ², ¯, and ´. Following the standard Bewley-style
model, the individual employment process is treated as an exogenous stochastic process.
Idiosyncratic employment shocks ² 2 f0;1g follow a Markov process with transition proba-
bility ¼
zz0´0
²²0 . Following the tradition of _ Imrohoro¸ glu (1989), we assume that the probability
of becoming unemployed next period (²0 = 0) depends not only on the current employment
status (²), but also on the current and next period's aggregate state (z and z0). Additionally,
to re°ect the heterogeneity exhibited in Figure 1, the probability of becoming unemployed
depends on the skill level in the next period (´0).
The discount factor ¯ is assumed to be stochastic. We assume that ¯'s process is in-
dependent of the other aggregate and idiosyncratic state variables. The Markov transition
probability is denoted as !¯¯0.
We assume that the individual skill level ´ 2 fu;sg follows an exogenous stochastic
process. This transition probability is denoted as q´´0. Again, we can interpret each agent as
an altruistic dynasty. Within each dynasty, the skill level may di®er across generations. The
probability q´´0 re°ects the intergenerational mobility of skill levels.10 The skill transition
process is assumed to be independent of the other state variables.
10In our formulation, the timing of the switch in ¯ and ´ may not coincide. Synchronizing these processes
is possible, but it complicates the analysis considerably and would not substantially alter our main results.
72.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let ¡ denote the measure of agents over (k;²;´;¯). The state variables relevant to each indi-
vidual are the aggregate state variables (z;¡) and the idiosyncratic state variables (k;²;´;¯).
Let T denote the equilibrium transition function for ¡:
¡0 = T(¡;z;z0):
Then, the recursive competitive equilibrium can be de¯ned in a standard manner. In the
recursive competitive equilibrium, consumers and ¯rms optimize given the state variables
and the transition function T. The markets for capital and labor clear, and the transition
function is consistent with the individual decision rules. See Appendix A for the formal
de¯nition.
2.4 Calibration
But for some deviation, we follow a standard calibration. One period is considered to be
six weeks.11 We choose ± = 0:0125 and the average value of ¯ as 0:995. The capital share
® = 0:36. The household production parameter h is assumed to be 0.1. These numbers
closely follow the calibration of Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). The borrowing constraint
k is set at ¡13, which is tighter than the \always payback constraint". This number is
chosen so that the fraction of the people with negative wealth mimics the actual data. In
the following we brie°y discuss the calibration of other parameters and stochastic processes.
The details of the calibration can be found in Appendix B.
Aggregate shocks take the values z 2 fb;gg = f0:99;1:01g. Following Krusell and Smith
(1999, 2002) we set the average business cycle duration to 2 years. From 1=(1 ¡ pbb) =
1=(1 ¡ pgg) = 16, pbb = pgg = 0:9375.
11The choice of six weeks is the standard one in the unemployment insurance literature (see, for example,
Hansen and _ Imrohoro¸ glu [1992]). In the business cycle literature, the choice of one quarter as a period is more
popular (including Krusell and Smith [1998, 1999, 2002]). However, we calibrate the average unemployment
duration in a \good" state to be 12.4 weeks, and as a consequence, we cannot use one quarter (13 weeks) to
be a period choice.
8The skill transition probabilities are calibrated by assuming that the transition probability
from skilled (college graduate) to skilled is 0.65, and the transition probability from unskilled
(high school graduate) to skilled is 0.35 for each generation.12 This restriction provides
quu = qss = 0:9975.
Calibrating individual employment shocks requires using data about unemployment rates
and unemployment durations for di®erent skill groups. We compute unemployment rates for
the skilled and unskilled workers by using the Current Population Survey. Since the average
duration of unemployment is similar across di®erent skill groups (Mincer [1991]), we use the
same unemployment durations for the skilled and the unskilled.
We assume that the discount factor ¯t follows a three-point Markov stochastic process.
The three values of ¯t are pinned down so that the resulting distribution of asset holdings
mimics the real wealth distribution. In particular, ¯l = 0:9923, ¯m = 0:995, and ¯h = 0:9977.
We calibrate the Markov transition matrix by following Krusell and Smith's (1998) approach.
In the model, Á(s)=Á(u) is the skill premium. To calibrate Á(s)=Á(u), we use the estimates
of Murphy and Welch (1992). They compute the ratio of the average wage of college graduate
workers to high-school graduate workers for di®erent experience groups and for several years.
They ¯nd that this ratio, which can be interpreted as the skill premium, is between 1.37 to
1.58. To be consistent with their estimates, we set Á(s)=Á(u) to 1.50.13
2.5 Model Solution
Generally, it is computationally burdensome to solve this type of model. The state variables
in the individual optimization include the economy-wide wealth distribution, which is an
12Mayer (2002, Table 1) shows that in PSID data, the intergenerational transition probability (between
fathers and sons) from no-college to college is 35%, while college to college is 73%. Statistics Canada (1998,
p.37) compares the intergenerational transition of schooling attainment across countries. It shows that in the
United States, 64.2% of the population attains postsecondary schooling if their parents attained postsecondary
education. If the parents attain only secondary education, the percentage drops to 35.7%.
13One can also calibrate Á(s)=Á(u) by using the estimates for return to college education. If one assumes
that the return to one year of college education is 10%, which is consistent with the estimates in Card (1995),
then Á(s)=Á(u) is around 1.50.
9in¯nite-dimensional object. In our model, the wealth distribution is included in the state
variables, since this information is necessary for predicting the next-period prices for each
aggregate state. To predict these prices, the agents have to predict the next period's aggregate
capital, which requires knowledge of the current period's wealth distribution. Krusell and
Smith (1998) developed a computational method to overcome this obstacle. They found
that the knowledge of only a few moments of the wealth distribution is often su±cient for
predicting the next period's aggregate capital. In fact, they demonstrated that a linear
prediction rule based only on the ¯rst moment ¹ k provides a very accurate prediction. They
call their method \approximate aggregation".
In our model, we postulate a prediction rule
ln¹ k0 = ®0 + ®1 ln¹ k + ®2 lnz:
The \approximate aggregation" method works very well in our setting|the linear prediction
rule with coe±cients ®0 = 0:1258, ®1 = 0:9747, and ®2 = 0:0849 provides a very accurate
prediction. The R2 of this prediction rule is 0:99997. This implies that almost all the
variation in ¹ k0 can be explained by the predicted value in the right-hand-side. The resulting
equilibrium can therefore be viewed as very close to the rational expectations equilibrium.
The aggregate capital °uctuates between the values ¹ k = 139:8 and ¹ k = 148:4. The average
value of ¹ k is 143:9. On average, skilled agents hold k = 176:1 and unskilled agents hold k =
111:7. Since the earning ratio is 1 : 1:5, the di®erence in asset holdings is more pronounced
than the earnings di®erence.14 This large di®erence in asset holdings is important, since
wealth holdings are the only means of self-insurance for unemployment in our incomplete-
market setting.
The wealth distribution is matched to the data. In the data,15 the Gini coe±cient of the
14This property can also be seen in data. The average wealth-earnings ratio of a college graduate is higher
than that of a high school graduate. See Budr¶ ³a Rodr¶ ³guez, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, Quadrini, and R¶ ³os-Rull (2002).
15All the data in this paragraph are drawn from Budr¶ ³a Rodr¶ ³guez, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, Quadrini, and R¶ ³os-Rull
(2002). Wol® (1995) employs a slightly di®erent de¯nition of wealth (the most notable di®erence is that he






























Figure 2: Wealth distributions for the skilled and the unskilled (truncated at k = 500)
wealth distribution is 0.80, while in the model, it is 0.79. In the right tail of the distribution,
the top 10% of wealth-rich people hold about 69% of the real economy's total wealth, while
68% of wealth is held by the top 10% in the model. In the data, the top 20% (¯fth wealth
quintile) hold 82% of the total wealth, while the corresponding number is 85% in the model.
In the left tail of the distribution, in the model, 7.2% of the agents hold negative wealth and
additional 1.8% of agents hold wealth less than 1 (the average wage of an unskilled worker is
about 3.6). In the data, 7.4% of the population report negative wealth and 2.5% report zero
wealth.
The model produces a substantial heterogeneity in asset holdings. As is expected, there is
a large di®erence in asset holdings across di®erent ¯: the average value of k is 47.6 for ¯ = ¯l,
124.3 for ¯ = ¯m, and 382.5 for ¯ = ¯h. Asset distributions are very di®erent between skilled
agents and unskilled agents. About 2% of individuals hold negative wealth within the group
does not include vehicles and pension plans). In Wol® (1995), the top 20% hold 85% of the total wealth and
the Gini coe±cient is 0.84.
11of skilled agents, while nearly 16% of unskilled agents fall into this category. About a quarter
of unskilled people own less wealth than their average wage level. The model produces more
wealth inequality within unskilled agents than within skilled agents: Gini coe±cients are 0.85
and 0.73, respectively. Both groups contain wealth-rich people: 1.3% of the unskilled and
2.3% of the skilled own more than ten times the average wealth. Figure 2 shows the wealth
distributions for the skilled and the unskilled workers. (The total number of agents is 50,000.
We truncated the Figure at the upper bound of k = 500.) Clearly, there are more unskilled
workers who are close to the borrowing constraint.
3 Removing Business Cycles
The main question to be answered is: What will happen to individuals' welfare when business
cycles are eliminated? To answer this, we follow Lucas's tradition in not describing speci¯c
policies to eliminate cycles. We directly eliminate shocks that are driving the aggregate
°uctuations. The elimination is permanent, and this event is unanticipated by the agents.
3.1 Aggregate Shocks
Since the aggregate shocks are the driving force of the business cycles, a natural way to
eliminate cycles is to replace the aggregate stochastic process by a deterministic process. In
the spirit of Lucas, we replace the aggregate stochastic process by its conditional mean. The
aggregate state z starts at z = 1:01 or z = 0:99, depending on the timing of the removal, and
z converges monotonically to the value 1, which is the unconditional mean of z.
3.2 Idiosyncratic Shocks
We assume that when the business cycles are eliminated, the part of the idiosyncratic risk
which is correlated with the aggregate shocks is also eliminated. Krusell and Smith (1999,
2002), who ¯rst proposed this procedure coined it the \integration principle". Formally,
when an idiosyncratic random variable y can be written as a function ¹ g(i;z) of the aggregate
12variable z and a random variable i which is independent from z, then the new idiosyncratic




with density fi(i) for each i. Here, fz(z) and fi(i) are the marginal density functions for z
and i, respectively.
As an example,16 consider an individual variable y = z + i, where z » N(¹z;¾2
z) and
i » N(¹i;¾2
i ) [thus, y » N(¹z + ¹i;¾2
z + ¾2
i )]. Our procedure results in ^ y(i) = ¹z + i. Since
i » N(¹i;¾2
i ), it follows that ^ y(i) » N(¹z+¹i;¾2
i ). Notice that the mean is the same between
y and ^ y(i), but the variance is reduced after applying the integration principle.
In our model, the individual random variable ² is a two-state Markov process, so the
decomposition is more complicated. Krusell and Smith (2002) have shown how to construct
idiosyncratic shocks in this case using the integration principle, and have developed a state
representation for the distribution of these shocks. In general, the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks is time-varying when there is an unanticipated and permanent elimination of business
cycles. For our purposes, since we have heterogeneity in skill levels, an extension of the
Krusell-Smith approach is necessary. See Appendix C for details.
The resulting employment process ^ y has less dispersion than ². Simulating for 10,000
periods, it turns out that the coe±cient of variation of ^ y is approximately 15% smaller than
² for agents whose initial state is ´ = s, and about 30% smaller for the agents whose initial
state is ´ = u. Therefore, agents face less earnings risk in an economy without business
cycles. The other individual random variables, ´ and ¯, are independent of the aggregate
shocks, and therefore their processes are unchanged after the elimination of business cycles.
16This example follows Lucas (2003).
133.3 Competitive Equilibrium
The equilibrium after removing business cycles does not have a recursive structure for two
reasons. First, the evolution of aggregate capital ¹ k and aggregate labor ¹ n (both are now
deterministic) is time-dependent. Second, to calculate ^ y at each time period, the entire
history of idiosyncratic shocks has to be taken into account.17 The competitive equilibrium
of this economy can be de¯ned in the standard way|consumers and ¯rms optimize given
prices, and the markets for capital and labor clear. See Appendix A for the formal de¯nition.
We employ three approximations to reduce the computational burden. First, since ¹ n
converges to a constant value fairly quickly, we treat ¹ n as a constant after a su±cient number
of periods. Second, we reduce the evolution of ¹ k to a single law of motion after a su±cient
number of periods. Third, we approximate the stochastic process of ^ y by a ¯ve-point Markov
process. These approximations serve to reduce the computational time dramatically, while
providing a fairly accurate approximation of the original economy.
3.4 Results
Our experiment is to eliminate business cycles at a speci¯c point from the °uctuating econ-
omy.18 The timing of this \elimination" (call it time 0) is selected according to a speci¯c
level of capital stock and aggregate shocks. It is natural to select a capital stock level around
the average of the °uctuating economy. Therefore, we choose ¹ k = 144. In the following, we
pick two timings, z = g and z = b, and compare the results.
After time 0, the economy experiences the transition to a non-°uctuating steady state.
We compare the welfare of each agent at time 0, taking this transition into account. The
17In Appendix C, it is shown that the necessary information about the history of the idiosyncratic shocks
can be summarized by two state variables. However, the evolution of those variables is also time-dependent.
18The algorithm used for the computation can be found in Appendix D.


























t=0 is the consumption stream in the \original" economy (with business cycles),
and fcs
tg1
t=0 is the consumption stream in the \smoothed" economy (without business cycles).
For logarithmic utility, we can show that
¸ = exp[(Vs ¡ Vo)=B] ¡ 1;







is the expected (average) discounted utility under the
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First, consider the case where we remove the business cycles when ¹ k = 144 and z = g. The
transition of aggregate capital is depicted in Figure 3. Capital stock initially increases (since z
is still larger than one for a while), then declines until ¹ k = 143:4 and slowly converges to a new
steady state with ¹ k = 143:8, which is slightly lower than the average value in the °uctuating
economy. (Figure 3 also depicts the capital stock of the °uctuating economy as a dotted
line.) Krusell and Smith (2002) similarly observed a lower steady-state level of capital. They
argued that the reason is because individuals have less incentive to save for precautionary
motives, due to the lower risk in their income. The fact that the capital stock is lower during
the most of the transition and at the new steady-state has an important implication for the
welfare comparison. From the fact that w = (1 ¡ ®)z¹ k®¹ n¡® and r = ®z¹ k®¡1¹ n1¡®, a lower ¹ k
increases r and decreases w. Depending on whether a particular agent relies on wage income
or capital income, this change will a®ect the agents di®erently.
In the new steady state, the Gini coe±cient increases to 0:82. Inequality increases within
both the unskilled and skilled groups: Gini coe±cients rise from 0.85 to 0.88 and from 0.73
to 0.76, respectively. This is consistent with Krusell and Smith's (2002) argument that there
is less precautionary saving in the new steady-state. With less precautionary saving, the


























Figure 3: Path of Aggregate Capital after Removing Business Cycles with ¹ k = 144 and z = g
left tail of the distribution is extended. In fact, the number of agents with negative assets
increases to 14.0% in total (24.5% for unskilled and 3.5% for skilled), which is almost double
compared to the °uctuating economy.
Our main goal is to compare the welfare between the two economies. We follow the
method described above and calculate the value of ¸ for each agent. The average value
of ¸ is 0.024%, which is more than three times larger than Lucas's (1987) result, and is
comparable to the numbers found in previous studies by Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and
Krusell and Smith (2002). There is a large heterogeneity between skill levels: unskilled
agents gain 0.043% from the elimination of business cycles, while skilled gain only 0.005%.
Therefore, the gain for unskilled agents, who are more frequently unemployed and more likely
to face binding borrowing constraints, is much larger than the gain suggested by the average
value of ¸. As a result of stabilization, 85.3% of unskilled workers have increased utility, while
the fraction of skilled workers with a positive gain is much smaller at 33.7%. In fact, the
majority of skilled workers experience lower utility after stabilization. Two e®ects produce
the di®erence in the cost of business cycles between skilled and unskilled workers. First, a
16asset level (in total wealth distribution)
constrained bottom 1% 10% 50% 90% 99%
´ = u, ² = 0 0.150% 0.065% 0.026% -0.027% -0.067% 0.133%
´ = u, ² = 1 0.117% 0.090% 0.068% 0.021% -0.036% 0.153%
´ = s, ² = 0 0.053% -0.008% -0.043% -0.083% -0.041% 0.112%
´ = s, ² = 1 0.027% 0.015% -0.004% -0.013% 0.011% 0.143%
Table 1a: The values of ¸ for ¯ = 0:995, ¹ k = 144, and z = g
asset level (in total wealth distribution)
constrained bottom 1% 10% 50% 90% 99%
´ = u, ² = 0 0.622% 0.373% 0.258% 0.138% 0.074% 0.300%
´ = u, ² = 1 0.222% 0.168% 0.131% 0.066% 0.035% 0.286%
´ = s, ² = 0 0.476% 0.297% 0.191% 0.081% 0.120% 0.292%
´ = s, ² = 1 0.063% 0.041% 0.024% -0.002% 0.069% 0.267%
Table 1b: The values of ¸ for ¯ = 0:995, ¹ k = 144, and z = b
majority of the skilled agents have already accumulated enough wealth to insure themselves
against the idiosyncratic risk. Unskilled workers tend to gain more since their level of wealth
is lower on average. Second, at an individual level, the unskilled agents were facing larger
unemployment risk under business cycle °uctuations. (There is also the general equilibrium
e®ect, whose direction is ambiguous. This e®ect is discussed below.)
The costs at an individual level are shown in Table 1a. We focus on the agents with
¯ = 0:995.19 We observe even larger heterogeneity at an individual level. For example, for
a wealth-constrained agent with ´ = u (unskilled) and ² = 0 (unemployed), the cost is more
than six times the average. (These are the agents whose cost is the highest.) This ¯gure,
0:150%, is nearly twenty times larger than the number obtained by Lucas (1987).
19Heterogeneity of costs across di®erent ¯ is discussed in detail by Krusell and Smith (2002). It would be an
interesting exercise to incorporate di®erent forms of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, such as one's spouse's
health or employment status. Clearly, this will add more dimensions to the heterogeneity in the economy.
Unfortunately, it is not computationally straightforward to incorporate these shocks into our current model,
since it will increase the number of state variables in the dynamic programming problem of the individuals.
17Avg ¸ Avg ¸ for ´ = u Avg ¸ for ´ = s % of u gaining % of s gaining
z = g 0.024% 0.043% 0.005% 85.3% 33.7%
z = b 0.081% 0.119% 0.043% 100.0% 56.3%
Table 2: Average gains from di®erent starting points
Next, consider the case where business cycles are eliminated when the aggregate state z
is b. After the elimination of business cycles, the economy moves toward the same steady
state as before. The average value of ¸ is higher in this case|it is 0.081% now. Again,
unskilled workers gain more (0.119% on average) than skilled workers (0.043% on average).
The ratio of the skilled workers who experience a positive gain is now 56.3%, while almost all
the unskilled workers experience a positive gain. The comparison between z = g and z = b
is summarized in Table 2.
The individual costs are summarized in Table 1b. In every cell, the value of ¸ is larger
than in Table 1a. The largest gain comes from the constrained agent with ´ = u and ² = 0.
The largest gain, 0:622%, is almost eighty times larger than what is found in Lucas (1987).20
When considering the welfare e®ect on individuals, two factors have to be taken into
account. First, the direct e®ect of the risk reduction, and second, the general equilibrium
e®ect. The ¯rst is straightforward. When business cycles are eliminated, the aggregate shocks
are completely smoothed out (the interest rate and the wage become deterministic variables),
and the idiosyncratic employment risk is reduced. This bene¯ts all agents, especially the
agents who cannot self-insure by their own savings. The second e®ect calls for a more careful
analysis. Since the capital stock is lower after eliminating business cycles, on average, the
interest rate rises and the wage falls. This bene¯ts an agent for whom capital income is more
20This is somewhat smaller than the ¯gure obtained in Krusell and Smith (2002). There are two factors
that reduce our numbers compared to theirs. First, in our calibration, the average duration of unemployment
is substantially shorter than Krusell and Smith's. Second, our borrowing constraint is tighter, therefore the
\constrained agents" here are not as wealth-poor as Krusell and Smith's. Indeed, when we calibrate our model
in a similar manner as Krusell and Smith, the largest gain for the unskilled workers increases to 1.807% (the
largest gain for the skilled workers is 1.427%). See Appendix E for details.
18important than wage income.
Keeping the employment status and skill status constant (within each rows of Table 1a
and Table 1b), the gains from eliminating business cycles exhibit a \U-shape" pattern.21
Borrowing-constrained agents have a larger gain, re°ecting the fact that they cannot self-
insure their risk by their own assets. The direct e®ect of the reduction in the idiosyncratic risk
is very large for these agents. The \middle class" tends to have small or negative gains. For
these agents, the bene¯t from the reduction in the idiosyncratic risk is small, since they have
enough assets to insure themselves. In this case, the general equilibrium e®ect dominates.
The middle-class agents whose income is largely coming from wage may experience lower
welfare due to the wage loss. Very rich agents realize welfare gains since their income is
largely coming from capital income.
Keeping the wealth level constant (within each columns of Table 1a and Table 1b), we
cannot always determine whether unemployed agents gain more than employed agents, or if
unskilled agents gain more than skilled agents, due to the presence of the general equilibrium
e®ect. For borrowing-constrained agents, the direct e®ect of the risk reduction tends to
dominate. For agents who are not constrained, the direct e®ect is smaller and the general
equilibrium e®ect is more pronounced. The general equilibrium e®ect works in an ambiguous
fashion. Given the wealth level, wage income is more important for the employed agents
than for the unemployed agents, simply because the employed agents earn higher wages.
Thus unemployed agents should gain more from the general equilibrium e®ect. In the future
however, the wealth level is not given. Given the current wealth level, the future wealth level
is higher for the employed agents. Therefore, employed workers bene¯t more from the higher
interest rate in future. The relative level of this current and future e®ect determines who will
gain more from eliminating business cycles. This same logic is applied to the relationship
between the skilled agents and the unskilled agents.
21This pattern is also observed in Krusell and Smith (2002). We observe some non-monotonicity after 99%.
194 Conclusion
In this paper we calculated the costs of business cycles for di®erent groups of people under
incomplete markets. We focused primarily on the di®erence in skills. Unskilled agents face
more cyclical unemployment risk and have less opportunity to self-insure. As a result, the
cost of business cycles is much larger for a typical unskilled agent compared to a typical
skilled agent. If business cycles are eliminated at booms, unskilled agents gain 0.043% (of
steady-state consumption) on average, while skilled workers gain only 0.005%. If business
cycles are eliminated in recessions, unskilled agents gain 0.119% on average, while skilled
workers gain 0.043%. In this case, borrowing-constrained, unskilled, and unemployed agents
gain as much as 0.622%, which is nearly eighty times larger than the number found using
the representative-agent framework.
This substantial heterogeneity raises natural questions about optimal policy. How should
the stabilization policy be conducted? Is it possible for the government to transfer risks
from unskilled to skilled workers instead of stabilizing the economy? Is there an optimal
mix of stabilization policy and insurance policy? These are important questions for future
research.22 The di®erence in costs also has an important implication in the political process.
It is likely that the majority of unskilled agents favor a stabilization policy (if it comes
with a small cost), while many skilled agents may vote against such a policy, if the burden
falls evenly on di®erent groups. A policy that directly transfers cyclical risk from unskilled to
skilled workers may be politically more agreeable. To analyze such possibilities, incorporating
speci¯c policies and political processes into an incomplete markets setting seems to be a
promising future research topic.
22See Lucas (2003) for related points.
20Appendix
A Formal De¯nitions of Equilibrium
A.1 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the Economy with Fluctua-
tions
De¯nition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) The recursive competitive equilib-
rium consists of the value function v(k;²;´;¯;z;¡), a set of decision rules for consumption
and asset holdings fc(k;²;´;¯;z;¡);k0(k;²;´;¯;z;¡)g, aggregate capital and labor f¹ k(z;¡); ¹ n(z;¡)g,
factor prices fw(z;¡);r(z;¡)g, and a law of motion for the distribution, ¡0 = T(¡;z;z0),
which satisfy
1. Given the aggregate states, fz;¡g, prices fw(z;¡);r(z;¡)g, and the law of motion for
the distribution, ¡0 = T(¡;z;z0); the value function v(k;²;´;¯;z;¡) and the individual
decision rules fc(k;²;´;¯;z;¡);k0(k;²;´;¯;z;¡)g solve the following dynamic program-
ming problem:
v(k;²;´;¯;z;¡) = max
c;k0 flogc + ¯E[v(k0;²0;´0;¯0;z0;¡0)j²;´;¯;z;¡]g
subject to





w(z;¡) = (1 ¡ ®)z¹ k®¹ n¡®;



















for all K ½ K, E ½ E, X ½ X, and B ½ B. K, E, X, and B are the sets of all possible
realizations of k, ², ´, and ¯, respectively. The indicator function If¢g takes the value
1 if the statement is true, and 0 if it is false. ¼
zz0´0
²²0 , q´´0, and !¯¯0 are the transition
probabilities.
A.2 Competitive Equilibrium for the Economy without Fluctuations
De¯nition 2 (Competitive Equilibrium without Aggregate Shocks) Let time 0 be
the moment when the business cycles are removed. Denote the history of idiosyncratic shocks
for an agent j by ht
j. The competitive equilibrium consists of individual decision rules for
consumption and the next period capital fct(ht
j);kt+1(ht
j)g, factor prices fwt;rtg, and the
aggregate variables f¹ kt; ¹ ntg that satisfy








with ¯0 = 1, subject to
ct + kt+1 = rtkt + wtÁ(´t)^ yt + (1 ¡ ±)kt;
kt+1 ¸ k:
222. Firms optimize:
wt = (1 ¡ ®)¹ k®
t ¹ n¡®
t ;












where ¡t is the measure over ´t and ^ yt.
B Calibration
In the following, we discuss how we calibrate the parameters and stochastic processes in
detail.
Aggregate Shocks






where pij is the probability of the transition from state i to state j. Following Krusell and
Smith (1999, 2002) we set the average business cycle duration to 2 years. Our model period is
six weeks, therefore the average duration is 16 periods. From 1=(1¡pbb) = 1=(1¡pgg) = 16,










The invariant distribution is [0.5 0.5].
Skill Transition
23For each generation, the transition probability from skilled (college graduate) to skilled
is 0.65, and the transition probabilty from unskilled (high school graduate) to skilled is 0.35.






























Note that if we start from the invariant distribution, the fraction of skilled workers remains
constant by the law of large numbers.
Individual Employment Shocks
For individual employment shocks ² 2 f0;1g, the transition matrix has to be conditioned
on last period's aggregate state (z), today's aggregate state (z0), and today's skill level (´0).
Denote this matrix as ¦zz0´0











The unemployment rate of skill level ´ when the aggregate state is z is denoted as ¹z
´. We
calibrate ¹z
´ from the Current Population Survey. Each year between 1970 to 2001 is divided
into two categories (with an equal number of good and bad years) by ranking the years
according to the total unemployment rate. ¹z
´ is given as the average unemployment rate of
23Mayer (2002, Table 1) shows that in PSID data, the intergenerational transition probability (between
fathers and sons) from no-college to college is 35%, while college to college is 73%. Statistics Canada (1998,
p.37) compares the intergenerational transition of schooling attainment across countries. It shows that in the
United States, 64.2% of the population attains postsecondary schooling if their parents attained postsecondary
education. If the parents attain only secondary education, the percentage drops to 35.7%.
24the skilled and the unskilled for the good and the bad years.24
The number of people who were unskilled and unemployed in the last period is Âu¹b
u.
They remain unskilled in the current period with probability quu. Thus, the number of people
who were unskilled and unemployed in the last period, and remain unskilled in the current
period is Âu¹b
uquu. The amount of people who were skilled and unemployed in the last period
is Âs¹b
s. They become unskilled in the current period with probability qsu. Thus, the amount
of people who were skilled and unemployed in the last period, and become unskilled in the
current period is Âs¹b
sqsu. Summing up, the people who were unemployed in the last period
and unskilled in the current period is Âu¹b
uquu +Âs¹b
sqsu. The people who were employed in
the last period and unskilled in the current period is Âu(1 ¡ ¹b
u)quu + Âs(1 ¡ ¹b
s)qsu. Thus,




sqsu Âu(1 ¡ ¹b

















10 Âu(1 ¡ ¹b
u)quu + ¼bbu







11 Âu(1 ¡ ¹b
u)quu + ¼bbu




Since the current period is a bad state, the ¯rst entry has to be equal to Âu¹b
u. This provides
us with the ¯rst restriction. (The second entry has to be equal to Âu(1¡¹b
u), but it is easy to
show that this is automatically satis¯ed by the ¯rst restriction, provided that Â is the invariant
distribution.) Now we have two unknowns, ¼bbu
00 and ¼bbu
10 , and one equation (the other





11 = 1). Another restriction is provided from the unemployment duration
data. The Current Population Survey provides the average duration of unemployment in each
year. We calculated the average duration in the good years and in the bad years (de¯ned by
the total unemployment rate), and obtained that the duration is 12.4 weeks for good years
24The skilled are de¯ned as individuals with some college or college completion, and the unskilled are de¯ned
as those with high school completion or less. Since the population of each group changes over time, we have
taken the weighted average of the unemployment rates in each group using the number of individuals aged 24
and up (the population is taken from the census data) at each year.
25and 15.9 weeks for bad years.25 Mincer (1991) shows (using PSID data) that the average
duration of unemployment is not signi¯cantly di®erent between skilled and unskilled workers,
and therefore we use the same numbers for the skilled and the unskilled. The restriction is
1=(1 ¡ ¼bbu













00 (_ Imrohoro¸ glu [1989])
2. ¼
bg´0




00 = 1:25 ¢ ¼
bb´0
00 (Krusell and Smith [1999, 2002]).
We follow Krusell and Smith.
From the data on unemployment between 1970 and 2001 (described above), we calculate
¹b
u = 0:087, ¹
g
u = 0:056, ¹b
s = 0:038, and ¹
g
s = 0:026.
Given above numbers, ¼bbu

























u)qu´0 + Âs(1 ¡ ¹z
s)qs´0
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25_ Imrohoro¸ glu (1989) uses the duration of 10 weeks in good times and 14 weeks in bad times. Krusell and


























Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we assume that the discount factor ¯t follows a
three-point Markov stochastic process. Let ¯t 2 f¯l;¯m;¯hg, where ¯l < ¯m < ¯h. An
agent with the discount factor ¯ = ¯l is impatient, and an agent with the discount factor
¯ = ¯h is patient. First, we calibrate the Markov transition matrix by imposing the following
restrictions.
² 10% of the total population has ¯ = ¯l, 80% of the population has ¯ = ¯m, and 10%
of the population has ¯ = ¯h.
² There is no direct transition in between ¯ = ¯l and ¯ = ¯h.
² The average duration of the extreme states, ¯ = ¯l and ¯ = ¯h, is one generation (30
years).



















Second, the values of ¯l;¯m;¯h are pinned down so that the resulting distribution of asset
holdings mimics the real wealth distribution. In particular, ¯l = 0:9923, ¯m = 0:995, and
¯h = 0:9977.
27C Applying the \Integration Principle" to Idiosyncratic Shocks
Applying the \integration principle" to a two-point process is more di±cult than the contin-
uous example in the main text. Here, starting from the static case, we extend the analysis
step by step.26
C.1 Static Case
Let z take two values, g and b, and ² take two values, 0 and 1. The aggregate state z occurs
with the probability ¼z(z), and ²'s probability depends only on the current z. The conditional
probability of ² given z is denoted as ¼(²jz). We de¯ne i » U(0;1), and
¹ g(i;z) =
(
1 if i · ¼(1jz);
0 otherwise.




¹ g(i;z)¼z(z) = ¹ g(i;g)¼z(g) + ¹ g(i;b)¼z(b) = 1 ¢ ¼z(g) + 1 ¢ ¼z(b) = 1:
When i 2 (¼(1jb);¼(1jg)],
^ y = ¹ g(i;g)¼z(g) + ¹ g(i;b)¼z(b) = 1 ¢ ¼z(g) + 0 ¢ ¼z(b) = ¼z(g):
When i 2 (¼(1jg);1],
^ y = ¹ g(i;g)¼z(g) + ¹ g(i;b)¼z(b) = 0 ¢ ¼z(g) + 0 ¢ ¼z(b) = 0:
In sum, ^ y = 1 with probability ¼(1jb), ^ y = ¼z(g) with probability ¼(1jg) ¡ ¼(1jb), and
^ y = 0 with probability 1 ¡ ¼(1jg).
C.2 Correlation over Time
When z and ² are correlated over time, applying this procedure becomes more complicated.
Suppose that z evolves by a ¯rst-order Markov process and that ²t depends on zt, zt¡1, and
26For exposition, in this section we utilized slightly di®erent notation than the main text. The correspon-
dence should be clear, however.
28²t¡1. Let it be an i.i.d. random variable which follows U[0;1]. We must then ¯nd a function






and then integrate ¹ gt(fisgt
0;fzsgt
0) over fzsgt





One way to do this is by brute-force simulation: generate zt and it randomly, and then create
²t from the realization. Iterate the simulation many times. Then, for each fisgt
0, there will
be a distribution of ²t (depending on the realizations (history) of z, ² can be di®erent for the
same fisgt
0). Average this out and use as the new idiosyncratic shocks at each t. We did not
utilize this method here.
C.2.2 Recursive
Instead, we utilized the following method, which exploits the recursive structure of the
problem. From the distributional assumptions, to express ²t by an i.i.d. random variable
it » U(0;1), the additional information required is zt¡1, zt, and ²t¡1. That is, given zt¡1, zt,
and ²t¡1, ²t can be determined by the rule
²t =
(
1 if it · ­(zt¡1;zt;²t¡1);
0 otherwise,
(3)
where ­(zt¡1;zt;²t¡1) is the threshold value calculated from the original Markov transition
matrices. However, we can not integrate this yet. ­(zt¡1;zt;²t¡1) still depends on ²t¡1. To
construct the ¹ gt(¢;¢) function, we still require ²t¡1 to be expressed by i and z. By working
from t = 0 using (3) (²¡1 is given), we can express ²t¡1 by ffisgt¡1
0 ;fzsgt¡1
0 g. Clearly, this
procedure has recursive structure.
Equation (2) can be expressed as ¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1) = ²t, where ²t¡1 on the left hand side
is actually a function of ffisgt¡1
0 ;fzsgt¡1









¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1) ¢ ¼z(zt;:::;z0):














¹ gt(it;b;zt¡1;²t¡1) ¢ ¼z(b;zt¡1;:::;z0):




















¹ gt(it;g;b;²t¡1) ¢ ¼z(g;b;zt¡2 :::;z0):
(4)
The second part can be expressed in a similar way.
Let Pt¡1(g;²) be the probability that, for given fisgt¡1
0 , the realization of fzsgt¡1
0 induces
(i) zt¡1 = g and (ii) ²t¡1 = ².







¹ gt(it;g;g;²t¡1) ¢ ¼z(g;g;zt¡2 :::;z0)
= ¹ gt(it;g;g;1) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;1) + ¹ gt(it;g;g;0) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;0):
(5)
Here, ¹ gt(it;g;g;1) is either 0 or 1, and is easy to calculate using (3). ¼z(gjg) is given by the
Markov transition matrix. Thus, given Pt¡1(zt¡1;²t¡1), ^ yt can be calculated only from the
information of it, using (5) for all possible combinations of zt¡1 and zt.
How can we get Pt¡1(zt¡1;²t¡1)? It can be calculated recursively. First, notice that
Pt¡1(zt¡1;0)+Pt¡1(zt¡1;1) = ¼z(zt¡1), where ¼z(zt¡1) can be mechanically calculated from
the Markov transition matrix and the initial value z0. Thus, we only need to keep track of
Pt¡1(zt¡1;1). To obtain Pt(g;1), we have to calculate the probability of (i) zt = g and (ii)
²t = 1. This can be done by just picking up the zt = g part in the ^ yt calculation (sum of
30(5) for all possible combinations of zt¡1 and zt), since ¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1) = 1 if ²t = 1 and
¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1) = 0 if ²t = 0. That is,
Pt(g;1) = ¹ gt(it;g;g;1) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;g;g;0) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;0)
+ ¹ gt(it;g;b;1) ¢ ¼z(gjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;g;b;0) ¢ ¼z(gjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;0):
In the same way,
Pt(b;1) = ¹ gt(it;b;g;1) ¢ ¼z(bjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;b;g;0) ¢ ¼z(bjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;0)
+ ¹ gt(it;b;b;1) ¢ ¼z(bjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;b;b;0) ¢ ¼z(bjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;0):
Note that
^ yt = Pt(g;1) + Pt(b;1)
by construction. Up to this part, our procedure follows Krusell and Smith (2002).
C.3 Extending to Multiple Skill Levels
Suppose that the employment probability is also dependent on skill level ´ 2 fu;sg, which
evolves stochastically. The evolution of ´ is ¯rst-order Markov, and independent of ² and z.
Speci¯cally, yt(= ²t) depends on ²t¡1, zt¡1, zt, and ´t. Now, (3) has to be modi¯ed to27
²t =
(
1 if it · ­(zt¡1;zt;²t¡1;´t);
0 otherwise.
(6)
Here, ²t¡1 depends on ffisgt¡1
0 ;f´sgt¡1
0 ;fzsgt¡1
0 g. Clearly, after integration, ^ y is a func-
tion of ffisgt
0;f´sgt









¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1;´t) ¢ ¼z(zt;:::;z0):














¹ gt(it;b;zt¡1;²t¡1;´t) ¢ ¼z(b;zt¡1;:::;z0):
27Clearly, ­(zt¡1;zt;²t¡1;´t) here should be set to ¼
zt¡1zt´t
²t¡11 in the main text.




















¹ gt(it;g;b;²t¡1;´t) ¢ ¼z(g;b;zt¡2 :::;z0):
(7)
The second part can be expressed in a similar way.
Let Pt¡1(g;²) be the probability that, for given ffisgt¡1
0 ;f´sgt¡1
0 g, the realization of
fzsgt¡1
0 induces (i) zt¡1 = g and (ii) ²t¡1 = ².







¹ gt(it;g;g;²t¡1;´t) ¢ ¼z(g;g;zt¡2 :::;z0)
= ¹ gt(it;g;g;1;´t) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;1) + ¹ gt(it;g;g;0;´t) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;0):
(8)
Here, ¹ gt(it;g;g;1;´t) is either 0 or 1, and can be calculated by (6). ¼z(gjg) is given by the
Markov transition matrix. Thus, given Pt¡1(zt¡1;²t¡1), ^ yt can be calculated only from the
information of it and ´t, using (8) for all possible combinations of zt¡1 and zt.
One could calculate Pt¡1(zt¡1;²t¡1) recursively. First, notice that again Pt¡1(zt¡1;0) +
Pt¡1(zt¡1;1) = ¼z(zt¡1), where ¼z(zt¡1) can be mechanically calculated from the Markov
transition matrix and z0. Thus, we only need to keep track of Pt¡1(zt¡1;1). To obtain
Pt(g;1), we have to calculate the probability of (i) zt = g and (ii) ²t = 1. This can be done by
just picking up the zt = g part in the ^ yt calculation (sum of (8) for all possible combinations
of zt¡1 and zt), since ¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1;´t) = 1 if ²t = 1 and ¹ gt(it;zt;zt¡1;²t¡1;´t) = 0 if
²t = 0. That is,
Pt(g;1) = ¹ gt(it;g;g;1;´t) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;g;g;0;´t) ¢ ¼z(gjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;0)
+ ¹ gt(it;g;b;1;´t) ¢ ¼z(gjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;g;b;0;´t) ¢ ¼z(gjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;0):
(9)
32In the same way,
Pt(b;1) = ¹ gt(it;b;g;1;´t) ¢ ¼z(bjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;b;g;0;´t) ¢ ¼z(bjg) ¢ Pt¡1(g;0)
+ ¹ gt(it;b;b;1;´t) ¢ ¼z(bjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;1)
+ ¹ gt(it;b;b;0;´t) ¢ ¼z(bjb) ¢ Pt¡1(b;0):
(10)
Note that
^ yt = Pt(g;1) + Pt(b;1)
by construction.
D Algorithm of the Economy without Fluctuations
Denote the last period with aggregate °uctuations as t = 0.
1. For each agent, given z0, ²0, and ´0, simulate it and ´t, and thus obtain the sequence
of Pt for t = 1;2;:::. Sum up and obtain the aggregate labor supply ¹ nt at t = 1;2;:::.
Check when ¹ nt and the distribution of the labor supply settles down. Call that period
N1. (We used N1 = 40 to 100, depending on the starting point.) From the process of
Pt, we can obtain the time series of ^ y. Instead of using Pt in the individual decision
problem, we approximate this process of ^ y by a ¯nite-state Markov process and use
this as the individual shocks.
2. Pick N2 > N1. (We used N2 = 1000.) Use the average of the law of motions in t < 0
to guess ¹ kt, t = 1;2;:::;N2. Call them ¹ k0
t.
3. Given the law of motion for ¹ k and the stationary value of ¹ nt, perform the value-function
iteration (part of Krusell-Smith's [1998] method) to obtain the value function for the
periods t = N1 + 1;:::;N2. Note that the decision problem is





V (k0; ^ y0;´0;¯0;¹ k0)j^ y;´;¯
¤ª
33subject to
c + k0 = rk + wÁ(´)^ y + (1 ¡ ±)k;
¹ k0 = H(¹ k);
k0 ¸ k;
r and w calculated from ¹ n and ¹ k.
4. From t = N1, work backwards to obtain value functions and decision rules for t =
1;:::;N1.





V (k0; ^ y0;´0;¯0;¹ kN1+1)j^ y;´;¯
¤ª
subject to
c + k0 = rk + wÁ(´)^ y + (1 ¡ ±)k;
k0 ¸ k;
r and w calculated from ¹ nN1 and ¹ k0
N1.
5. Simulate the economy from t = 0, using the initial distribution at t = 0 and the decision
rules obtained above.
6. Compare the simulated path of ¹ k and ¹ k0. If they are not close enough, update the
¹ k sequence by the weighted average. Also obtain the new prediction rule for ¹ k by
performing OLS for the new ¹ kt, t = N1;:::;N2.
E Krusell-Smith Calibration
To see how our model can be compared to Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002), we conducted
the same experiment with a calibration similar to Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). Krusell
and Smith's calibration exhibits longer unemployment durations and higher unemployment
rates.
34One period is considered to be a quarter following Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). We
choose ± = 0:025 and the average value of ¯ as 0:9894. The capital share ® = 0:36. The
household production parameter h is assumed to be 0.1. These numbers closely follow the
calibration of Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). The borrowing constraint k is set at ¡6, which
is tighter than the \always payback constraint". We set skill premium (Á(s)=Á(u)) to 1.50
as in our baseline calibration.
As in Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002), aggregate shocks take the values z 2 fb;gg =











The invariant distribution is [0.5 0.5].
The skill transition matrix is set so that the stochastic process of skill is the same as the




















We follow Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) and set duration of unemployment to 1.5
quarters in good times and 2.5 quarters in bad times. In Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002),
unemployment rate is set to 4% in good times and 10% in bad times. To calibrate the




















Then we pick the unemployment rate of the skilled and unskilled workers so that the average




u = 0:0546, ¹b
s = 0:0610, and ¹
g
s = 0:0254. After following the same procedure as in the

















































For ¯, we follow the calibration of Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). The transition prob-



















The values of ¯l;¯m;¯h follow Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002). In particular, ¯l = 0:9858,
¯m = 0:9894, and ¯h = 0:9930.
We follow the same computational procedure as in the benchmark case. The average value
of ¹ k in the °uctuating economy turns out to be around 46, and we conducted the experiment
at ¹ k = 46:0. To highlight the di®erence from the benchmark model, Table 3 summarizes the
36asset level (in total wealth distribution)
constrained bottom 1% 10% 50% 90% 99%
´ = u, ² = 0 1.807% 1.024% 0.681% 0.315% 0.286% 0.406%
´ = u, ² = 1 0.629% 0.440% 0.321% 0.127% 0.171% 0.334%
´ = s, ² = 0 1.427% 0.874% 0.551% 0.266% 0.325% 0.536%
´ = s, ² = 1 0.218% 0.141% 0.090% 0.042% 0.162% 0.431%
Table 3: The values of ¸ for ¯ = 0:9894, ¹ k = 46, and z = b
results that corresponds to Table 1b in the main text. (That is, the result when z = b.) In
this experiment, the average value of ¸ for the unskilled workers is 0.283% (while the skilled
¸ is 0.128%). This is much larger than the corresponding average numbers (0.110% with
low aggregate capital and 0.096% with high aggregate capital) in Krusell and Smith (2002).
When z = g, the average value of ¸ for the unskilled workers is 0.096% (while the skilled ¸
is 0.067%). Again, this is larger than the corresponding average numbers (0.089% with low
aggregate capital and 0.087% with high aggregate capital) in Krusell and Smith (2002).
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